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Abstract
As adversarial attacks pose a serious threat to the security of AI system in practice, such
attacks have been extensively studied in the context of computer vision applications. However,
few attentions have been paid to the adversarial research on automatic path finding. In this
paper, we show dominant adversarial examples are effective when targeting A3C path finding,
and design a Common Dominant Adversarial Examples Generation Method (CDG) to generate
dominant adversarial examples against any given map. In addition, we propose Gradient
Band-based Adversarial Training, which trained with a single randomly choose dominant
adversarial example without taking any modification, to realize the “1:N” attack immunity
for generalized dominant adversarial examples. Extensive experimental results show that, the
lowest generation precision for CDG algorithm is 91.91%, and the lowest immune precision for
Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training is 93.89%, which can prove that our method can
realize the generalized attack immunity of A3C path finding with a high confidence.
Keywords: path finding, reinforcement learning, dominant adversarial example, adversarial
training, attack immunity
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is providing major breakthroughs in solving the problems that
have withstood many attempts of natural language understanding, speech recognition, image
understanding and so on. The latest studies show that the correct rate of image understand-
ing can reach 95%(He (2016)) under certain conditions, meanwhile the success rate of speech
recognition can achieve 97%(Xiong (2016)). However, with the development of AI the weak-
nesses of it are gradually exposed which can be exploited by attackers. Recently, a report(T.
Ren (2017)) issued by Real-time Smart Security Execution Lab of Berkeley University pointed
out that there are still many great challenges faces by AI system, and one of the challenges is
the adversarial attack.
Adversarial attack was discovered firstly by Szegedy (2013) in the context of image clas-
sification. Such attacks generally exploit the so-call “adversarial examples” to deceive AI
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systems, which can lead them make mistake. The general form of adversarial examples is the
information carrier (such as image, voice or txt) with small perturbations added, which can
remain imperceptible to human vision system.
To summarized, the research of adversarial example attack is mainly focused on the fol-
lowing three fields. In terms of image understanding, an attacker can construct an adversarial
example by adding invisible perturbations on image. Such adversarial example can deceive
the automatic driving image recognition system to identify the STOP logo as a speed limit
of 60 mark(Kurakin (2016)). Similarity, an attacker can add small perturbations on a panda
image to generate an adversarial example, so that the image recognition system can identify
it as a gibbon with great confidence(Goodfellow (2014)). In the aspect of speech recognition,
Carlini (2016) found that the speaker can emit a noise which human can not recognize as an
adversarial example. However, the noise can be correctly identified by certain mobile phones
as corresponding voice commands, so as to make the phone switch to flight mode, dial 911
and take other behaviors. Moreover, in the domain of Atari game, Mnih (2013) have also con-
ducted an adversarial example by adding noise to the game background. Which can realize
the jamming of the baffle on the ball.
However, few attentions have been paid to adversarial research in the domain of automatic
path finding. Due to the universality of robot applications in personal, business or even
military, the attack on automatic path finding will generate very serious and unestimated
results, which should not be ignored any more. Therefore, in this paper, we would like to take
adversarial research on automatic path finding.
In the scenario of path finding, the most important supporting technology is reinforce-
ment learning algorithm. For the pervious research, reinforcement learning algorithm such
as Q-Learning(Konar (2013)), DQN(Osband I (2016)), A3C(Mnih (2016)), etc. all have been
utilized for automatic path finding. Meanwhile, A3C relies on parallel actor-learners and
accumulated updates to reduce the training time while improving training stability. Hence,
compared with other traditional reinforcement learning algorithms, Asynchronous Advantage
Actor-Critic (A3C) is a better and more general RL algorithm for automatic path finding.
Therefore, in this paper, we choose A3C path finding as the object for our study.
In the scenario of A3C path finding, adversarial attack is confronted with the “local map
information”, which is different with other existing works in adversarial research. As in the
domain of image understanding, speech recognition and Atari game, attackers take adversarial
attack to “global carrier information” by adding human invisible perturbations to the global
image, or generating human indistinguishable speech. We can call adversarial examples that
target global carrier information as implicit adversarial examples.
However, in A3C path finding, the robot can not obtain the global map image in the process
of path finding. In other words, under such scenario, the target of adversarial research is the
local map information (such as, environment information for the current position), instead of
the global map image. Hence, it is not feasible to conduct an adversarial attack on A3C path
finding with implicit adversarial examples.
As there is no well-found work has been proposed to solve this problem to our knowledge.
Therefore, in order to fill this gap, we give the very first attempt to design a new type of
adversarial example for A3C path finding, which can be called as dominant adversarial
example . Dominant adversarial example can implement adversarial attack against local
map information obtained under A3C path finding, which will make robot can not reach its
destination successfully, or let the total time for path finding is extremely long(e,g., Figure 1).
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Figure 1: The example for results of dominant adversarial attack. The first picture means that for the
original map without perturbation, the result of robot automatic path finding based on reinforcement learning
algorithm (A3C). We can see that the robot can reach its goal smoothly from the start point. The second
picture shows one possible result for successful adversarial attack. For dominant adversarial examples, the
robot can not reach the destination successfully. For another possible result, which can be shown in the third
picture, robot can reach its goal but the total time is extremely long. It is 10 times or even hundreds times of
the normal path finding(which can be shown in the first picture).
Moreover, experiments have shown that the dominant adversarial example proposed in this
paper can realize adversarial attack in A3C path finding successfully with high accuracy.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We give the very first attempt to discover dominant adversarial examples in A3C path
finding, which can realize adversarial attack successfully. By carrying out the white-box
analysis of discovered examples, and summarizing the common rules, we firstly propose
a common generation method for dominant adversarial examples, which can generate
examples effectively for any given map.
(2) We creatively design a defense method, which can be called as “Gradient Band-based
Adversarial Training”. This method can realize the immunity to attack based on the
dominant adversarial example discovered in this paper directly, without modifying the
parameters of algorithm or neural network. Moreover, we utilize a single example for Gra-
dient Band-based Adversarial Training, which can realize “1:N” attack immunity against
generalized dominant adversarial examples.
Therefore, in this paper we realize adversarial research of A3C path finding. We give the
very first attempt to discover dominant adversarial examples which can attack successfully,
and firstly propose a common generation method for such examples, which can generate ex-
amples for any given map. In addition, from the perspective of defense, we design a defense
method against generalized dominant adversarial examples, by training with a single discov-
ered example without taking any modification. So as to improve the adversarial robustness of
A3C path finding.
The structure of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the related works
in this field. Section 3 gives a detailed definition of notions and success criteria in this paper.
Section 4 describes the overall architecture for Gradient Band-based Generalized Attack Im-
mune Model proposed in this paper. Section 5 gives the experimental evaluation, and the last
section gives the conclusion for this paper.
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2. Related Work
As adversarial attacks pose a serious threat to the security of AI system in practice. This
fact has recently lead to a large influx of contributions in this direction. Mainly includes the
design of adversarial examples and the proposal of defenses under such attack.
2.1. Adversarial Examples Design
In the domain of image recognition system, adversarial attacks have been extensively stud-
ied(e.g. Madry A (2017),Miyato T (2017)), Kurakin (2016) et al. investigated that the
adversarial examples can deceive machine learning in the physical world. Their results showed
that 87% of the adversarial examples can successfully deceive the machine. Liu Y (2016) et
al. extended the application of adversarial deep learning to image recognition and detection,
and they proposed an optimization method named “ensemble for constructing adversarial
pictures”.
In the automatic speech recognition system, Carlini (2016) et al. produced adversarial
voice commands by adding human indistinguishable noise. The voice commands generated
are incomprehensible to the listener but can be interpreted by the device as a correct command.
In Atari game, Mnih (2013) have also conducted an adversarial examples by adding noise
to the game background, which can realize the jamming of the baffle to the small ball.
However, few attention has been paid on adversarial example in automatic path finding.
Therefore, under such scenario, we discover dominant adversarial examples which can attack
A3C path finding successfully. In addition, we design a common generation method for domi-
nant adversarial examples, based on the white box analysis, which can generate corresponding
adversarial examples for any given map.
2.2. Defense Against adversarial attack
One defense is to modify the training or input data. Szegedy (2013) et al. proposed
adversarial training as the first line of defense against adversarial attack. The robustness of
network is improved by constantly inputting new types of adversarial examples, and perform-
ing adversarial training. Since adversarial training necessitates increased training/data size, is
refer to it as ‘brute-force’ strategy. Xie C (2017) et al. showed that resizing of the adversarial
examples can reduces their effectiveness. Moreover, adding random padding to such examples
also results in reducing the fooling rates of the networks.
Another way to defense against adversarial attack is to modify the neural networks. A.S.
Ross (2017) et al. studied input gradient regularization(Drucker H (1992)) as a method for
adversarial robustness. Moreover, it has been shown that when combine with ‘brute-force’
adversarial training, can result in a good performance against adversarial attack. Papernot
N (2016) et al. proposed a notion of ‘distillation’ to improve the robustness of deep neu-
ral networks against adversarial example, which generated by adding small perturbations to
image.
Moreover, some studies proposed utilizing additional networks as a defense against the
adversarial attacks. Gao J (2017) et al. proposed to insert a masking layer immediately
before the layer handling the classification. A single training network is added to the original
model, which can achieve immunity to adversarial examples without adjusting the coefficients
of network. Xu W (2017) et al. proposed to use feature squeezing to detect adversarial
perturbation to an image. They utilized two additional models to detect wether the image is
adversarial example.
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For our work, we creatively design a generalized attack immune model based on a single
dominant adversarial example discovered in this paper, instead of modifying the parameters
of neural network, or utilizing the additional networks. We can call this model as “Gradient
Band-based Generalized Attack Immune Model”. This model can achieve “1:N” generalized
immunization against multiple dominant adversarial attacks, by taking adversarial training
with a single example. Compared with the traditional adversarial training, we do not need
a huge sample expansion for the training set, which can greatly improve the total training
speed.
3. Preliminaries
In order to solve the problem of adversarial attack under A3C path finding. This paper
first propose to utilize dominant adversarial example, which can attack successfully. In this
section, we give a detailed definition of implicit/dominant adversarial example respectively.
Moreover, we summary the success criteria for dominant adversarial attack in the form of a
mathematical formula.
3.1. Discovery of Dominant Adversarial Example
To summarize the relevant research works on adversarial attack, we find that the research
object of traditional adversarial examples is global carrier information on the pixel level. For
example, adding pixel-level invisible noise to the whole image, which can misleads the neural
network to give wrong recognition results, or adding pixel-level perturbations to the game
background which indistinguishable to human, will make game can not work properly. We
can call this kind of example as implicit adversarial example, which can be defined as:
• Definition 1: Implicit adversarial example is a modified version of clean infor-
mation carrier, which generated by adding human invisible perturbations to the global
information on pixel level to confuse/fool a machine learning technique.
However, under A3C path finding, robot has no idea with the global map image when
seeking way on the given map. In the continuous process of unsupervised learning, robot can
only perceives the status information of current position, such as, whether obstacles exist in
the current position, accessible status of all directions, and whether the robot has reached its
destination already. In addition, the robot recognizes the obstacles on physical level instead
of pixel-level image information. Therefore, as the processing objects are different (Pixel-
level global information/Physical-level local information), utilizing the traditional implicit
adversarial examples to attack is ineffective under A3C path finding.
Therefore, we study the adversarial attack in A3C path finding, and discover that dominant
adversarial example can attack successfully under this scenario, which can be defined as follow:
• Definition 2: Dominant adversarial example is a modified version of clean map,
which generated by adding physical-level obstacles to change the local information to
confuse/fool A3C path finding.
Through experiments, we find that adding “baffle-like” obstacles to the original map can
effectively impact the robot’s path finding. As shown in Figure1, by adding “baffle-like”
perturbations on the original map, robot can not reach its destination successfully from the
start point, or in another case, the robot can achieve the destination but the total time is
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Figure 2: The example for dominant adversarial examples in A3C path finding.The first column on the left is
the original map without adding any obstacles, and the three columns on the right are examples for dominant
adversarial examples after adding perturbations. For each map, we record wether the robot has reached its
destination and the total time for path finding. We find that by adding “baffle-like” obstacles to the original
map can perturb robot path finding effectively.
extremely long compared with the normal situation. It can be seen that the obstacles we
added do not block the path of robot at all, in other words, robot can bypass the added
obstacles and search map continuously (for example, it can be shown in the experiment that
under Q-Learning path finding, robot can bypass the added obstacles and achieve the end point
successfully ). However, the robot is still affected by “baffle-like” obstacles added and can not
find its way properly. As the obstacles we add here is different from implicit adversarial
example that invisible to human on pixel level, we call this kind of example as dominant
adversarial example(e.g. Figure2), and call attack that utilize such examples as dominant
adversarial attack.
3.2. Success Criteria for Dominant Adversarial Attack
Meanwhile, in order to determine whether the dominant adversarial example can attack
A3C path finding successfully, and to measure the effect of attack, we define the success criteria
for dominant adversarial attack in the form of a mathematical formula.
Firstly, we will define two sufficient conditions for the dominant adversarial example success
attack:
• Sufficient condition 1: Agent does not reach the target location point eventually.
In order to give a mathematical standardization for this sufficient condition, we utilize
Euclidean distance(Danielsson (1980)) to calculate the distance between agent ending position
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and the agent target position, which can be defined as follow.
d(Aactual, Ddestination) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(Aactuali −Ddestinationi)2 (1)
where Aactual denotes the actual position that the agent eventually arrives, which can be
represents as Aactual = {Aactual1 , Aactual2}, and Ddestination is the target for robot path finding
which can be concluded as Ddestination = {Ddestination1 , Ddestination2}. If d(Aactual, Ddestination) =
0 then prove that the agent has achieved the target position, else prove that the attack has
succeed, and the greater distance is the better effect of dominant adversarial attack.
• Sufficient condition 2: The total time for agent path finding is too long compared
with the normal situation.
We utilize the ReLU function to measure the attack effect of dominant adversarial attack.
If the total time for path finding is less than the threshold ε then prove that this attack has
failed, and the value for ReLU function will be 0. Moreover, if the total time for path finding is
bigger than ε then prove that this attack has succeed. We can define this condition as follow.
ReLU(Ttotal − ε) =
{
Ttotal − ε if Ttotal − ε > 0
0 if Ttotal − ε < 0
(2)
where Ttotal means the total time recorded for path finding, ε denotes the threshold for normal
time. If ReLU(Ttotal − ε) = 0 then prove that the attack has failed, if ReLU(Ttotal − ε) > 0
denotes that the attack has succeed, and the larger the value is the better effect of dominant
adversarial attack.
We stipulate that as long as one or more of the two sufficient conditions is proved to be
true, then show that the attack is success. Therefore, the measurement formula for attack
effect can be defined as:
Fattack(Aactual, Ddestination, Ttotal) = ω1Relu(Ttotal − ε) + ω2d(Aactual, Ddestination)
= ω1Relu(Ttotal − ε) + ω2
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(Aactuali −Ddestinationi)2
(3)
where ω1, ω2 are the weights for two sufficient conditions, and ω2 > ω1,
∑
ωi = 1. As it can be
seen that, the result for robot can not reach its destination is more serious than the increase
of pathfinding time. In other words, the first sufficient condition has a greater influence on
the attack effect, so its weight in the measurement formula for attack effect should be larger.
If Fattack = 0 then denotes that the attack has failed, if the Fattack > 0 denotes the attack has
been successful, and the greater Fattack is, the better effect of dominant adversarial attack.
4. Gradient Band-based Generalized Attack Immune Model
In this paper, we propose a generalized attack immune model based on gradient band,
which can be shown in Figure 3, mainly consists of Generation Module, Validation Module,
and Adversarial Training Module.
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Figure 3: Architecture for the gradient band-based generalized attack immune model
For the original clean map,in Generation Module we generate dominant adversarial ex-
amples Example = {Example1, Example2, · · · , ExampleN} based on the Common Domi-
nant Adversarial Examples Generation Method (CDG) proposed in this paper. Then in the
Validation Module, we utilize the well trained A3C agent against the original clean map,
to calculate the Fattack for each example based on the success criteria for attack. Veri-
fying whether the dominant adversarial examples obtained can attack A3C path finding
successfully. Selecting the examples whose Fattack > 0, then we can get Exampleattack =
{Example1, Example2, · · · , Examplem}.
In Adversarial Training Module, we utilize a single example Examplek which can attack
successfully for adversarial training. Then we can obtain a newly well trained A3C agentnew.
For the last part, we take use of all remaining samples that included in Exampleattack to attack
agentnew. In the second Validation Module, we calculate Fattack for each example to verify the
immune effectiveness for our model.
4.1. Common Dominant Adversarial Examples Generation Method(CDG)
In order to find the generation rule of dominant adversarial examples, we analyze the
dominant adversarial examples obtained. As shown in the first line for Figure4, are the
dominant adversarial examples for the original map which can attack successfully. We find
that the ”baffle-like” obstacles to these examples all located on a perturbation band, which
marked with the red dotted lines. Hence, we give white-box analysis to the well trained agent
model for the original map, to get the contour graph, and the three-dimensional surface chart
based on the value for each position on the map, which can be shown in the second line for
Figure4. Moreover, we mark the direction in which the value gradient rises the fastest with
red line in the contour graph.
By comparison, we can find that on the dominant adversarial example perturbation band,
the value gradient rises the fastest. Therefore, we can also call this perturbation band as
“gradient band”. By adding obstacles on the cross section of gradient band can perturb the
agent’s path finding successfully. Therefore, we can define the generation rule for the dominant
adversarial example as:
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Figure 4: The first line shows dominant adversarial examples for the original map. The first picture denotes
the original map for attack, and the three columns on the right are the dominant adversarial examples of
successful attacks. Meanwhile, the red dotted lines represent the perturbation band. The second line shows
the white-box analysis for the value of each position on the original map. The red line denotes the direction
in which the value gradient rises the fastest. By comparison between dominant adversarial examples and the
contour graph, we find that on the perturbation band, the value gradient rises fastest.
• Generation Rule: Adding “baffle-like” obstacles to the cross section of gradient band
in which the value gradient rises the fastest, can impact A3C path finding.
We can utilize the generation rule of dominant adversarial examples to design a common
examples generation method (CDG), which can obtain dominant adversarial examples for any
given map. As the core for CDG is to add “baffle-like” obstacles on the gradient band in
which value gradient rises the fastest. Therefore, the first step of this method is to find the
most rapid direction of value gradient rises.
4.1.1. Gradient Function
In this paper, we take use of Gradient Descent to find the most rapid direction of value
gradient rises. The core idea of this algorithm can be concluded as, for each iteration, searching
in the negative direction of gradient from the starting point (Xk, Y k), until we find the optimal
value of update step, then we utilize this step to get a new point (Xk+1, Y k+1) for the next
iteration, which can be concluded as:
Xk+1 = Xk − αkx
∂
∂Xk
V (Xk, Y k)
Y k+1 = Y k − αky
∂
∂Y k
V (Xk, Y k)
(4)
where V is the value function of X and Y, αkx, α
k
y denote the gradient descending step for
Xk, Y k respectively, which need to meet
φ(αkJ) = argminV (J
k − αJ ∂
∂Jk
V (J)), J = X, Y (5)
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in other words, we would like to find αkJ which can make X
k+1(Y k+1) is the point with
minimum function value in the gradient descending direction. When the descending height is
less than the predefined threshold ε, the drop is stopped and consider that we have obtained
the function minimum point.
We can see clearly from the three dimensional surface in Figure4, the well trained A3C
model has the lowest value near the starting point and the obstacle point, while has the highest
value near the ending point. Hence, under such scenario, we need to preprocess the value of
each point on the map before using Gradient Descent,
V alue(X, Y )new = V aluemax − V alue(X, Y )original (6)
where V alue(X, Y )new and V alue(X, Y )original denote the new and original value for point
(X, Y ) respectively, V aluemax means the maximum value on the map. Therefore, we transform
the problem to find the most rapid direction of value gradient descent for a given map, then
we can utilize the Gradient Descent to solve this problem.
4.1.2. Gradient Band Calculation
We record the points set (X, Y ) = (x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn) which located on the most
rapid direction of value gradient rises, and utilize the Least-Square method to fit a function
which can be called as “gradient function”. We assume that the fitting function is y =
a0 +a1x+ ...+akx
k. Then the sum of distances from each point to this curve can be calculated
as:
R2 =
n∑
i=1
[yi − (a0 + a1xi + ...+ akxki )]2 (7)
where (xi, yi) denotes the original point, and we can call this step as calculating the sum
of deviation squares. In order to find ai which can satisfies the criteria, we take the partial
derivative of ai to the right side of the equation, then can be represented as a matrix:
n
∑n
i=1 xi · · ·
∑n
i=1 x
k
i∑n
i=1 xi
∑n
i=1 x
2
i · · ·
∑n
i=1 x
k+1
i
...
...
. . .
...∑n
i=1 x
k
i
∑n
i=1 x
k+1
i · · ·
∑n
i=1 x
2k
i


a0
a1
...
ak
 =

∑n
i=1 yi∑n
i=1 xiyi
...∑n
i=1 x
k
i yi
 (8)
Then to simplify we can get 
1 x1 · · · xk1
1 x2 · · · xk2
...
...
. . .
...
1 xn · · · xkn


a0
a1
...
ak
 =

y1
y2
...
yn
 (9)
Therefore, we get the polynomial coefficient matrix A, and finally obtain the gradient function
f(x, y) = y − (a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk) we need.
In order to calculate the Gradient Band more accurately, we consider two kinds of situa-
tions according to the difference for original map and gradient function, one situation is that
obstacles exist on both sides of the gradient function, and the other one is that obstacles exist
on one side of the gradient function.
A. Case 1: Obstacles exist on both sides of the gradient function.
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Figure 5: Example for Gradient Band calculation under case 1. We establish the coordinate system as shown
in the right picture. The red line denotes the gradient function curve f(x, y), the upper blue line f(x, y)upper
is the upper bound for the Gradient Band, and the lower blue line is the lower bound for the Gradient Band.
The overall idea for Gradient Band calculation is that, we calculate the distance from all
the obstacle edge points in the original map to the gradient function curve, to find the nearest
one. Finally, we find the curve which is parallel to the gradient function and passes through
this point as the upper/lower bound for the Gradient Band.
Therefore, for the first step, we calculate the distance from all the obstacle edge points
Obstacle = {(Ox1 , Oy1), (Ox2 , Oy2), · · · , (Oxn , Oyn)} on original map, to the gradient curve
f(x, y) = y − (a0 + a1x + ... + akxk) obtained. Computing the distance from edge point
(Oxi , Oyi) to the gradient function, is to find a point (Gxk , Gyk) on this curve which can
makes the distance vector
−→
d = (Gxk − Oxi , Gyk − Oyi) perpendicular to the tangent vector−→
t = ( df
dGy
, df
dGx
), which can be shown on the right in Figure5. Then we can get the following
equations. 
f(Gxk , Gyk) = 0
(Oxi −Gxk)
df
dGy
− (Oyi −Gyk)
df
dGx
= 0
(10)
By solving this equation group, we can find the nearest point (Gxk , Gyk) on the gradient curve
against the obstacle edge point (Oxi , Oyi). By calculating the distance between these two
points, we can get the distance from (Oxi , Oyi) to the gradient curve.
Distance(f(x, y), Oi) =
√
(Oxi −Gxk)2 + (Oyi −Gyk)2 (11)
As in this case, obstacles exist on the both sides of the gradient curve, then we need to
traverse all the coordinate points in Obstacle = {(Ox1 , Oy1), (Ox2 , Oy2), · · · , (Oxn , Oyn)}, and
to find the nearest two points from this gradient curve in the upper and lower part respectively.
We utilize these two points to calculate the upper and lower bounds of the Gradient Band,
which are parallel to the gradient function. Hence, we can conclude the Gradient Band function
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Figure 6: Example for Gradient Band calculation under case 2. We establish the coordinate system as shown
in the right picture. The red line denotes the gradient function curve f(x, y), the lower blue line is the lower
bound for the Gradient Band.
FGB(x, y) as: 
f(x, y)upper = y − (U+a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
f(x, y)lower = y − (L+a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
XL < x < Xmax, YL < y < Ymax
(12)
where f(x, y)upper and f(x, y)lower denote the upper/lower bound function respectively, Xmax
and Ymax denote the boundary value of the map, (XL, 0) and (0, YL) are the intersection points
of f(x, y)lower and the coordinate axis, which can be shown in Figure 5.
B. Case 2: Obstacles exist on one side of the gradient function.
In this case, the calculating for distance between obstacle edge points and gradient function
is same with case 1. However, under such scenario, obstacles exist on one side of the gradient
function curve, hence, we can only obtain the upper/lower bound function for the Gradient
Band. For example, as shown in Figure 6, we can only get the lower bound for the Gradient
Band by calculating. Therefore, for this situation, we utilize the boundary point (Xmax, 0)
and (0, Ymax) of original map, to get the function equation which is parallel to the gradient
function. Then we take the smaller one as the upper bound for Gradient Band. Hence, we
can conclude the Gradient Band function FGB(x, y) as:
f(x, y)upper = min{f(Xmax, 0), f(0, Ymax)}
f(x, y)lower = y − (L+a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
XL < x < Xmax, YL < y < Ymax
(13)
Therefore, for any given map, we can generate dominant adversarial examples by com-
mon dominant adversarial examples generation method (CDG), which can be concluded as
Algorithm 1.
4.2. Attack Effectiveness Validation
In order to verify the attack effectiveness of dominant adversarial examples, we design a
validation algorithm which can be concluded as Algorithm 2.
12
Algorithm 1 Common Dominant Adversarial Examples Generation Method (CDG)
Input: Obstacle = {(Ox1 , Oy1 ), (Ox2 , Oy2 ), · · · , (Oxn , Oyn )},V (x, y)
Output: Obaffle = {FY1 , · · · , FX1 , · · · }
1. Gradient function calculation
i. Processing the value for each point on original map
V alue(X,Y )new = V aluemax − V alue(X,Y )original
ii. Calculating the fast direction of gradient descent based on Gradient Descent algorithm
Xk+1 = Xk − αkx ∂∂Xk V (Xk, Y k), Y k+1 = Y k − αky
∂
∂Y k
V (Xk, Y k)
iii. Getting the set of coordinate points for this direction (X1, Y 1), (X2, Y 2), · · · , (Xn, Y n)
2. Gradient Band calculation
i. Fitting function based on least square method R2 =
∑n
i=1[yi − (a0 + a1xi + ...+ akxki )]2
1 x1 · · · xk1
1 x2 · · · xk2
...
...
. . .
...
1 xn · · · xkn


a0
a1
...
ak
 =

y1
y2
...
yn

ii. Getting the fitting function f(x, y) = y − (a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
iii. Gradient Band Calculation
A. Calculating the distance from the obstacle edge points to the gradient function f(x, y)
Distance(f(x, y), Oi) =
√
(Oxi −Gxk )2 + (Oyi −Gyk )2
B. Finding the obstacle edge points with the smallest distance in the upper/lower parts
Oupper = (Oxupper , Oyupper ), Olower = (Oxlower,Oylower
)
a. If OupperandOlower both exist:
Calculating the upper/lower boundary functions, getting the Gradient Band function FGB(x, y)
f(x, y)upper = y − (U+a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
f(x, y)lower = y − (L+a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
XL < x < Xmax, YL < y < Ymax
b. If only one of OupperandOlower exist:
Calculating the upper/lower boundary functions with (Xmax, 0) or (0, Ymax) getting the Gradient
Band function FGB(x, y)
f(x, y)upper = min{f(Xmax, 0), f(0, Ymax)}
f(x, y)lower = y − (L+a0 + a1x+ ...+ akxk)
XL < x < Xmax, YL < y < Ymax
3. Obstacle function set generation
i. Setting Y = [1, 2, · · · , Ymax] and X = [1, 2, · · · , Xmax] to FGB(x, y) respectively, generating the obstacle function
set Obaffle = {FY1 , · · · , FX1 , · · · }
Under different categories of map size, the sample space for dominant adversarial examples
is different. For MapN×N , the sample space SMapN×N can be concluded as:
SMapN×N =

Example1
Example2
...
Example2×(N−1)
 , FMapN×N =

Fattack1
Fattack2
...
Fattack2×(N−1)
 , VMapN×N =

Example1
Example2
...
Examplek
 (14)
For each map, we utilize the A3C agent which well trained with the original clean map, to
test the attack effectiveness of dominant adversarial examples generated by CDG algorithm in
Generation Module. For each example MapN×N in the sample space, we record the total time
for path finding Ttotali , and the position point that agent actually arrive Aactuali = {Ai, Yi}, to
calculate the Fattacki value for each example in SMapN×N to generate FMapN×N . If Fattacki > 0
then denotes that the Examplei can attack A3C agent successfully, and if the Fattacki = 0
represents that the Examplei is invalid. Therefore, we can select the dominant adversarial
examples which can attack successfully, to generate a valid sample space VMapN×N .
4.3. “ 1:N ” Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training
As the defense against adversarial attacks mainly including three directions (Akhtar N
(2018)), which are modify the training or input data, modify the neural network, and utilize the
13
Algorithm 2 Dominant Adversarial Attack Effectiveness Validation
Input : Example = {Example1, Example2, · · · , ExampleN}, Examplei = {Ttotali , Aactuali = (Xi, Yi)},
Ddestination
Output : Exampleattack = {Example1, Example2, · · · , Examplem}
i. for Examplei in Example
Fattacki (Aactuali , Ddestination, Ttotali )
=ω1Relu(Ttotal − ε) + ω2
√∑n
i=1(Aactuali −Ddestinationi )2
if Fattacki > 0
then Exampleattack.append(Examplei)
ii. print Exampleattack
Figure 7: Example of the training data set for Traditional Adversarial Training and Gradient Band-based
Adversarial Training. Compared with the traditional method, Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training
proposed in this paper, utilizes a single example which selected randomly to realize the general immunization,
which reduces the size of training data and improves the training efficiency.
additional model. For the last two directions, we need to modify the structure or parameters of
neural network. While for traditional adversarial training under the first direction, it requires
the training is performed using strong attacks and the architecture of network needs to be
sufficiently expressive. Moreover, the traditional adversarial training necessitates increased
training data size, which will greatly increase the total training time.
Therefore, under such scenario, we design a defense method which can be called as Gradient
Band-based Adversarial Training. This method does not need to modify the parameters for
neural network, or add additional networks. For Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training
proposed in this paper, we select a single example in valid sample space VMapN×N randomly, to
realize the “1:N” attack immunization for generalized dominant adversarial attack. In other
words, this method utilizes a single example to conduct adversarial training, instead of using
a large amount of training data under traditional method (e.g. Figure 7), which is a more
concise and efficient method compared with other defense approaches.
5. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the experiment results and give a comprehensive evaluation of
Gradient Band-based Generalized Attack Immune model proposed in this paper.
5.1. Experimental Setup
5.1.1. Experimental Preparation
• Experimental Environment
Our experiment is conducted on the operating system of Linux on the hardware environ-
ment Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6400 CPU @2.70GHz, 8GB RAM and IT hard disk, which can
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be concluded in Table. We utilize the programming language python 2.7 to implement A3C
path finding under the given map.
Operation System Linux 16.04
Processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6400 CPU @2.70GHz
RAM 8GB RAM
Driver IT hard disk
Language Python 2.7
• Experimental Data
The map for automatic path finding is a grid-world of size N × N with randomly placed
obstacles, in which the start position is denoted by a blue square, the destination position is
denoted as a red square, and the agent for training is represented by a blue circle ( e.g. Figure
2 ). We select 10 different map sizes (Map = {Map10×10,Map20×20, · · · ,Map100×100}) which
each with 1000 randomly generated map samples, and utilize a total of 10,000 map samples
as the data base for our experiment.
• Baseline Method
As the research objective in this paper, is the physical-level perturbations under A3C
path finding. Hence, under such scenario, to verify the effectiveness of the generalized attack
immune model proposed in this paper, we select the traditional adversarial training and the
gradient regularization ( discussed in section 2) as the baseline method for our analysis.
5.1.2. Experimental Analysis
A. Generate precision analysis for CDG algorithm
In order to analyze the generate precision for CDG algorithm in Generation Module pro-
posed in this paper, we utilize CDG algorithm to generate dominant adversarial examples for
each original clean map. For the examples obtained, we utilize the well trained A3C agent to
verify whether the example can attack path finding successfully. For each Example, we calcu-
late the success criteria Fattack, to take statistics for the number of examples whose Fattack > 0,
then we can calculate the generation precision (PrecisionNgeneration) for CDG algorithm under
this map.
B. Immune precision analysis for Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training
We utilize a single dominant adversarial example in the valid sample space VMapN×N , to
retrain the A3C agent by Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training, then we can obtain a
new A3C agentnew with general immune ability. In order to verify this ability, we utilize all
remaining examples in VMapN×N to conduct attack experiments on agentnew. By taking statis-
tics for the number of dominant adversarial examples, which can be successfully immunized
by agentnew (Fattack = 0), we can measure the immune precision of the Gradient Band-based
Adversarial Training proposed in this paper.
C. Impact factors analysis for generation/immune precision
From the data level, we analyze the influence of map size on the generation/immune
precision. We select 10 different map sizes (Map = {Map10×10,Map20×20, · · · ,Map100×100}),
under each category we generate 1,000 map samples randomly, and utilize a total of 10,000 map
samples as the data base for our experiment. Calculating the generation/immune precision
under each map dimension category respectively, and taking analysis to the result.
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Table 1: Statistics on the attack effect for samples of Dominant Adversarial Examples
Original map Dominant Adversarial Example Time Actual Arrived Point Fattack
MapA
ExampleI Tmax(s) (1,2) 25.07
ExampleII Tmax(s) (14,15) 9.80
ExampleIII Tmax(s) (8,9) 16.18
ExampleIV Tmax(s) (6,6) 18.79
MapB
ExampleI Tmax(s) (15,3) 17.37
ExampleII Tmax(s) (17,9) 12.65
ExampleIII 94 (s) (19,19) 16.00
ExampleIV Tmax(s) (15,2) 18.10
MapC
ExampleI Tmax(s) (13,8) 14.40
ExampleII 85 (s) (19,19) 13.75
ExampleIII Tmax(s) (16,16) 8.18
ExampleIV Tmax(s) (6,1) 21.65
MapD
ExampleI 109(s) (19,19) 19.75
ExampleII Tmax (6,0) 17.27
ExampleIII 8(s) (19,19) 0.00
ExampleIV Tmax(s) (19,11) 6.00
D. Time efficiency analysis
Time complexity reflects the magnitude of the increase for the algorithm execution time
as the input scale grows, hence, it can measures the performance of the algorithm to a large
extent. Therefore, we analyze the time complexity of CDG algorithm proposed in this paper,
to evaluate the efficiency based on the algorithm level. In addition, we also record the total
training time for the Traditional Adversarial Training and the Gradient Band-based Adver-
sarial Training respectively. Analyzing the time efficiency of Gradient Band-based Adversarial
training proposed in this paper compared with the traditional method, to take evaluation on
application level.
E. Failed attack/immune examples analysis
For the CDG algorithm proposed in this paper, we take analysis of the failed attack
examples which can not attack successfully, to explain the reason of failure for such dominant
adversarial attack. Moreover, we try to find out the underlying rules for the failed dominant
adversarial examples. In addition, for the Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training proposed
in this paper, we also take analysis of the failed immune examples, which can attack the
retrained A3C agentnew after adversarial training successfully. To find the underlying rules
for such examples.
5.2. Experimental Result and Evaluation
5.2.1. Dominant Adversarial Examples Generation Validity Analysis
In order to verify the generation effectiveness of CDG algorithm proposed in this paper,
we take analysis of the generation precision.
For a original clean MapN×N , we utilize CDG algorithm proposed in this paper under
Generation Module, to generate dominant adversarial examples. As shown in Figure8, is
the samples for dominant adversarial examples generation results against original clean map
shown on the left column. We calculate the Fattack value for each example according to the
attack success criterion, to verify whether this example can attack the well trained A3C agent
successfully (e.g. Table1). If Fattack > 0, then denotes that this dominant adversarial example
can attack A3C path finding successfully. If Fattack = 0 represents that this example is an
invalid adversarial example. By taking statistics of the examples whose Fattack > 0 to compute
the generation precision for CDG algorithm under this map, which can be concluded as
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Figure 8: Samples for Dominant Adversarial Examples. For the first column is the original clean map for path
finding. Four columns on the right are the samples for Dominant Adversarial Examples generated by CDG
algorithm proposed in this paper under Generation Module.
PrecisionNgeneration =
Nsuccess
Mtotal
(15)
where Nsuccess denotes the number of examples that can attack successfully, Mtotal is the total
number of examples generated by CDG algorithm, and N denotes the map size.
In order to improve the accuracy for our analysis, we calculate the generation precision
for 1,000 maps under each map size, and utilize the average value of PrecisionNgeneration as the
generation precision under MapN×N . As shown in Table 2, for all the categories of map-size,
the lowest value for PrecisionNgeneration is 91.91% and the highest value is 96.59%. Proving that
the CDG algorithm proposed in our model, is able to generate dominant adversarial examples
which can attack A3C path finding successfully with high confidence.
5.2.2. Generalized Immune Effectiveness Analysis
• “1:N” immune precision analysis
We utilize any single example in the valid sample space VMapN×N which can attack A3C
path finding successfully under MapN×N to retain the A3C agent with Gradient Band-based
Adversarial Training, then we can obtain a new agentnew with general immune ability of
“1:N”. In order to verify the this generalized immunization ability of agentnew, we take use of
all remaining examples in VMapN×N to attack agentnew under A3C automatic path finding.
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Table 2: Statistics on the generation/immune precision under each map size.
Map Size Generation Precision Immune Precision
Map 10× 10 94.44% 98.64%
Map 20× 20 96.59% 97.22%
Map 30× 30 94.83% 96.36%
Map 40× 40 95.15% 95.67%
Map 50× 50 94.90% 95.70%
Map 60× 60 93.22% 94.55%
Map 70× 70 93.48% 93.02%
Map 80× 80 92.77% 94.17%
Map 90× 90 92.70% 94.05%
Map 100× 100 91.91% 93.89%
Figure 9: Statistics of the generation/immune precision under each map size. The 10 categories for map size
can be concluded as Map = {Map10×10,Map20×20, · · · ,Map100×100}, which can be shown in each graph. The
red line denotes the precision curve for generation precision, and the blue line denotes the precision curve for
immune precision.
By calculating the Fattack value for each example, we can take statistics of the number
for dominant adversarial examples which can be immunized by agentnew (Fattack = 0), then
we can calculate the immune precision to evaluate the effectiveness for Gradient Band-based
Adversarial Training under MapN×N , which can be concluded as:
PrecisionNimmnue =
Isuccess
Nsuccess
(16)
where Isuccess denotes the number of examples which can be successfully immunized by agentnew,
and Nsuccess is the number of examples that can attack successfully in the valid sample space
VMapN×N , and N denotes the map size.
• Baseline method comparison
In order to improve the accuracy of analysis, we conduct experiments on 1,000 maps under
each map size, and take the average value of PrecisionNimmune as the immune precision under
MapN×N . As shown in Table 2, is the immune precision under each map size, the lowest
value of immune precision is 93.89%, and the highest value of immune precision is 98.64%,
which can prove that Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training proposed in this paper, can
makes the agentnew trained with a single example realizing the generalized immunity to the
vast majority of valid attack examples. In other words, the agentnew generated by Gradient
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Band-based Adversarial Training, can realize the general adversarial examples immunization
of “1:N” with a high confidence.
As shown in Figure 11 is the immune precision comparison curve, for the Gradient Band-
based Adversarial Training proposed in this paper and the baseline methods. The green line
denotes the baseline method for Gradient Regularization(GR) which own the lowest precision
(83.67%), and the blue line represents the baseline method for Traditional Adversarial Training
with own the highest precision (96.54%), and the red line is the immune precision curve for
Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training proposed in this paper, which own a relatively high
immune precision (95.50%).
Although the immune precision of Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training is lower than
that of Traditional Adversarial Training, however, the time processing efficiency of our method
is much higher than that of the traditional one, which can be shown in the Table 3. Therefore,
under such scenario, we believe that the performance of Gradient Band-based Adversarial
Training proposed in this paper is the best.
Figure 10: The effect of map-size on genera-
tion/immune precision
Figure 11: Immune precision comparison curve for
three methods
5.2.3. Impact Factors Analysis
Through experiments we find that, the size of map has effect on generation/immune preci-
sion. We calculate the generation/immune precision values under different categories of map
size, which can be shown in Figure 9 and 10. The blue line denotes the distribution curve of
immune precision, and the red one represents the distribution curve of generation precision.
As shown in Figure 9 is the generation/immune precision distribution of 1,000 map samples
under each map size, and Figure 10 shows the change of the overall precision curve as the
changing for map size.
We can see that, from the overall trend, with the increase of map size, the precision of
generation and immune has decreased to some extent. However, the lowest value for generation
precision and immune precision are 91.91% and 93.89% respectively. Therefore, it can be
considered that, the Gradient Band-based Generalized Attack Immune model proposed in this
paper, can realize generalized immunization to dominant adversarial attacks with a relatively
high accuracy under different categories of map size.
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Figure 12: Time efficiency comparison
Table 3: Time efficiency for Traditional Adversarial Training and our Immune Model
Method
Map-size
Map10×10 Map20×20 Map30×30 Map40×40 Map50×50
Traditional Adversarial Training 984.30 s 2,832.21 s 4,248.63 s 7,162.80 s 7,818.12 s
Generalized Attack Immune Model 256.13 s 501.40 s 547.50 s 705.28 s 769.52 s
Method
Map-size
Map60×60 Map70×70 Map80×80 Map90×90 Map100×100
Traditional Adversarial Training 11,624.28 s 14,686.98 s 19,803.42 s 25,727.52 32,259.42 s
Generalized Attack Immune Model 925.53 s 981.75 s 1,140.75 1,302.00 s 1,455.75 s
5.2.4. Time Complexity Analysis
• Time efficiency for CDG algorithm
In order to measure the processing efficiency for CDG algorithm proposed in this paper,
we take analysis of the time complexity for this algorithm to prove the time efficiency of it.
For the gradient function calculation, the time complexity for value processing is O(N),
and the time complexity for calculating the gradient function is O(N), as the Gradient De-
scent algorithm used for this step only needs to calculate the first derivative. Meanwhile, for
the gradient band calculation, the time complexity for fitting function calculation is O(kN2),
while the time complexity for computing the distances from obstacles edge points to the gra-
dient function is O(N), and the time complexity for the calculating to upper/lower boundary
functions is O(1). In addition, for the obstacle function set generation, the time complexity
is O(N).
Algorithm Steps Time Complexity
Gradient function calculation
Value processing O(N)
Gradient function calculation O(N)
Gradient band calculation
Fitting function calculation O(kN2)
Distances computation O(N)
Upper/Lower boundary functions calculation O(1)
Obstacle function set generation O(N)
Therefore, we can see that the time complexity for CDG algorithm proposed in this paper
is polynomial, which can prove that our algorithm can generate dominant adversarial examples
with a high processing efficiency.
• Time efficiency for Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training
In order to prove the time efficiency for the Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training
proposed in this paper, we record the training time for Traditional Adversarial Training and
our training method respectively, and the results can be shown in Table 3 and Figure 12.
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Figure 13: The samples for failed attack examples. By taking analysis, we can find that adding perturbations
to the area where close to the start point and destination point, will reduce the effectiveness of attack.
We find that the training method proposed in this paper is much better than the Traditional
Adversarial Training in processing efficiency. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the Gradient
Band-based Adversarial Training in our experiment for immune training.
5.2.5. Failed Examples Analysis
• Failed attack examples analysis
We take analysis of the failed attack examples generated by CDG algorithm, which can
be shown in Figure 13. We choose samples under four categories of map size, which are
Map20×20,Map40×40,Map60×60,Map80×80, and it is worth to be noted that under Map20×20 we
only discover two invalid dominant adversarial examples for attacking, while under other map
dimensions, we choose four invalid examples randomly to take analysis.
By taking analysis to the failed dominant adversarial examples, we can find that, the
interference obstacles added are close to the starting point or the destination point. When
the “physical-level” perturbations added to such area, the dominant adversarial examples
generated by CDG will can not attack A3C path finding effectively.
• Failed immune examples analysis
We also take analysis of the failed immune examples, which can still attack the agentnew
that retrained by Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training. As shown in Figure is the
samples for failed immune examples. We choose the same original map with the analysis of
failed attack examples to make a better comparison, and for Map20×20 we only discover a
single failed example which can attack agentnew successfully, meanwhile, for Map40×40 three
failed immune examples have been found.
21
Figure 14: The samples for failed immune examples. By taking analysis, we can find that adding perturbations
to the area with high density of original obstacles on the Gradient Band, will reduce the effectiveness of
immunization.
By taking analysis to the failed immune examples, which can still attack agentnew that
retrained by Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training, we discover that, most of the per-
turbations for failed examples are in the area, with high density of original obstacles on the
Gradient Band. In other words, when adding perturbations to such area will reduce the
effectiveness of immunization.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we pay attention to the adversarial research on automatic path finding,
and show that dominant adversarial examples are effective when targeting A3C path finding.
Moreover, we design a Common Dominant Adversarial Examples Generation Method (CDG),
which can generate dominant adversarial examples for any given map. In addition, we propose
a Gradient Band-based Adversarial Training, which trained with a single randomly choose
dominant adversarial example (“ 1 ”) without taking any modification, to realize the “1:N”
attack immunity for generalized dominant adversarial examples (“ N ”).
We provide extensive experimental evidence on 10,000 map samples generated randomly
under 10 different categories of map size. The lowest generation precision for CDG algorithm is
91.91%, and the highest precision is 96.59%, which show that our CDG algorithm can generate
valid dominant adversarial examples with a high confidence. Moreover, as the lowest immune
precision is 93.89%, and the highest precision is 98.64%, the Gradient Band-based Adversar-
ial Training proposed in this paper, can realize the “1:N” attack immunity for generalized
dominant adversarial examples with high immune precision.
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